HISTORY
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Broadly speaking, Alaska's oil development history has two phases: PROMISES and PERFORMANCES. It has been our experience that promises can be easily made when they are necessary to calm public outrage, but promises can only be measures by the commitment to follow through which is performance. Based on Alaska's experience, the decline of aggressive public involvement and local control means that it is likely that the performance will not match the promise.
In June of 1968 oil companies announced the discovery of the giant oil field at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's north slope. With that announcement began the long and often heated debate about how to get oil to market. Formal and informal meetings and discussions were held by industry, concerned citizens and government officials. All sides of the issue were discussed.
Agencies within the U.S. Government started discussing the possibilities. How would the oil be delivered to market, who would do it and how would it be regulated were among the many topics discussed.
In April 1969 the United States Department of Interior established a Federal Task Force on Alaska Oil Development. This task force was later expanded by President Nixon to include all Federal agencies that might have decision-making responsibility regarding the transportation of the oil.
The oil industry considered several transportation options, finally settling on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline which would bring the oil from the north slope wells, some 800 miles, to tidewater where it would be loaded aboard tankers for shipment to markets.
In June of 1969 a formal application for a pipeline Right-of-Way was filed with the United States Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management for the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.
Strong opposition to this route came from environmental concerns and the fishermen of Prince William Sound. Their main concern was the marine leg of the transportation system and the potential for a major tanker accident. So strong was the opposition to the pipeline that environmentalists and fishermen filed suits blocking, at least temporarily, construction of the controversial pipeline in 1970. |
| PROMISES |
Several formal hearings were held to discuss issues and concerns related to the granting of the Right-of-Way lease. At those hearings testimony was taken from government officials, the oil industry and concerned citizens. The issues raised by the concerned citizens were responded to by a host of assurances that the transportation system would be the safest in the world.
In hearing before the U.S. Department of Interior in 1971, the consortium of oil companies known as Alyeska presented testimony that was meant to convince all opposition that the industry would be responsible in the construction and operation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline project. In public testimony Alyeska's pollution control specialist R. L. Beynon, an oil pollution specialist who was seconded from British Petroleum (BP) said:
"The contingency plan will be drawn up will detail methods for dealing promptly and effectively with any spill which may occur, so that its effects on the environment will be minimal. We have adequate knowledge for dealing with oil spills and improvements in techniques and equipment are continuing to become available through world-wide research. The best equipment, materials and expertise which will be made available as part of the contingency plan, will make operations at Port Valdez and in Prince William Sound the safest in the world." 1
The Federal Task Force prepared a multi-volume Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that examined various alternative routes, analyzed the economic, security, geological, and engineering aspects of getting the oil to market. The Task Force favored an all U.S. system thereby eliminating the possibility of a pipeline through Canada.
In 1972 the U.S. Interior Department, after a two year environmental study, gave its approval to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) project, but construction was still held up pending the outcome of the court challenges.
In March of 1972 at hearings before the U.S. Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, proponents of the pipeline like Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) president Thornton F. Bradshaw testified that the United States:
"... can no longer afford continued delay in bringing Alaskan oil to the people who need it. ... We can build a better and safer line today than we could have without the intervention of the environmentalists, ...but we think they are overdoing it now." 2
At the same series of hearings, opponents like the Sierra Club's Brock Evans Said:
"... the Alaska route would be an environmental disaster ..."3
In April of 1973, the President of Alyeska, E. L. Patton, in testimony before the U.S. Congressional Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, promised Congress that the very best technology would be in place:
"... In safety [sic] superior American tankers, the light traffic between Valdez, Alaska, and the west coast involves hazards of less magnitude than any other tanker run of which I have knowledge. The most modern loading equipment and proposed vessel design will reduce even these modest risks before pipeline authorization begins..." 4
In addition to the industry representatives giving testimony several U.S. Congressmen made statements during the debate in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System would not create a substantial environmental risk.
The Nixon administration favored construction of TAPS. President Nixon, in his April 18, 1973 energy message gave loud vocal support to building the pipeline. Several members of the Nixon Cabinet went to work on promoting early construction of TAPS and suggesting laws would be changed to protect the environment. "TRUST US" was the cry.
During the Senate debate on the issue, on July 13, 1973, U.S. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska said:
"... I am convinced that stringent requirements for deballasting ships at Valdez, new ships built with latest structural design, and stringent operational procedure to avoid collision and grounding will all contribute to virtually eliminate oil losses at sea." 5
he continues by saying:
" Opponents of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline know that every safeguard is being taken to protect the environmental quality of our waterways." 6
All of the proponents of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System were very upbeat and lobbied long and hard to convince the American public that the development of Alaskan oil and its transport by U.S. tankers, crewed by U.S. seamen, would reduce all risks to such an extent that there would be little to no environmental harm. So convincing was the Project Description that even Rogers Morton, the Secretary of the Department on Interior, when speaking of oil-spill contingency plans said:
"...plans...will be kept current in the light of new technology to assure their maximum effectiveness. The Coast Guard will augment its personnel and equipment to insure a maximum capability in this regard. ..." 7
Secretary Morton also told the Joint Economic Committee on June 22, 1972,
"Newly constructed American flag vessels caring oil from Port Valdez to U.S. ports will be required to have segregated ballast systems, incorporating a double bottom..." 8
The undersecretary of the Interior Department, John C. Whitaker, testified before the U.S. House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Public Lands, on April 18, 1973, that the tankers in the Alaska trade would be "double bottom..." 9
At every debate answers were given that assured the opposition in Congress, the environmentalists, the fishermen and the American public, that new laws and regulations would be forthcoming that would provide adequate safeguards for the protection of the environment. The Federal Government would adopt policy and rules to make the marine transportation system safer or so they said. They even tried to initiate change in the traditional Maritime Industry.
The fishermen and environmentalists were very skeptical and in the end lost their fight, but not by much. As you may recall, on July 17, 1973 the U.S. Congress after long debate voted the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA). The vote in the Senate was a tie, the tie was broken by then vice-president Spiro T. Agnew (Nixon Administration) and the argument to build TAPS was ended. This piece of enabling legislation cleared the way for the courts to rule in favor of the pipeline proponents and at the same time block future court challenges concerning the building of TAPS.
Then came the laws, regulators and regulations, many of tried to incorporate the commitments made by the proponents and clam the fears of the opponents. The problem was that the laws and regulations were overly broad, but then so were the commitments to protect the environment. It is not necessarily that those making the commitments to protect the environment were being untruthful, but perhaps they were so committed to the project that they overstated their ability. In addition, the length of time required to change the laws and regulations spanned many years and several changes in the National and State governments.
With the passage of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act the federal government was required to authorize construction of the pipeline and provide all necessary actions to see that it be done without delay. In other words do what ever was expedient to start building TAPS.
Vigilance, by some, was the watch word during the design and construction of TAPS. We thought the American Public demanded it. In 1973, as a young engineer who worked for the company charged with the design and construction of the Valdez Marine Terminal and 12 Pump Stations, I know we tried to design a system that would protect the environment. That is what some of us thought our mission was. In May of 1974, when we moved to Alaska to start construction of the project, great care was taken to prevent damage and reduce disturbance of the environment. State and Federal inspectors demanded it and those charged with TAPS construction diligently tried to comply.
Federal and State agencies were created or expanded to cope with the additional demand for oversight. The State of Alaska had recently created the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) to deal with the protection of Alaska's environment. In 1974 the federal government created the Office of the Federal Pipeline Inspector to ensure that the technical and environmental stipulations contained in the pipeline Right-of-Way lease across lands were enforced. The State of Alaska also created the Office of the Pipeline Coordinator to ensure that the stipulations contained in the lease across state lands were enforced. Thus the pipeline had two offices to oversee pipeline construction.
However, tanker traffic had been overlooked. There were no specific stipulations or special requirements for the tanker traffic contained in the State and Federal leases. Because of this oversight, in 1975, the State of Alaska created the Alaskan Oil Tanker Task Force which pulled together the department heads of the concerned state agencies. This was done after it became clear that those far away in the federal government were incapable of or no longer interested in bringing forth new laws and regulations so easily promised during all those hearings. The State of Alaska, at that time, felt it needed to ensure that the State's interests were heard concerning tanker safety issues. 10
In 1976, the Alaska State Legislature enacted legislation to give the state the ability to develop its own set of laws and regulations covering all aspects of marine oil transportation and handling. The idea was that local control could better address local issues and protect local interests. the Tank Vessel Act included a provision authorizing ADEC to adopt a comprehensive system of traffic regulations that did not conflict with regulations adopted by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and one authorizing the Governor to enter into interstate compacts to fulfill the intent of the legislation. In addition, the Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Act enacted by the State of Alaska prohibited the discharge of oil in state waters and required the payment of annual risk charges by terminal operations and vessel owners into a fund to pay for clean-up, research, oversight and administration. The amount of the annual risk charge was dependent upon the presence or absence of the safety features built into the terminal or vessels to reduce pollution and accidents.
In 1977, the newly elected Carter administration, after a series of tanker accidents in or near U.S. waters, created its own Tanker Task Force. Members of that group included the Secretary of Transportation and other cabinet level officials, who were charged with the development of a position on tanker issues. The USCG was instructed to develop new tanker safety regulations which included double bottoms on all new tankers over 20,000 deadweight tons. In May of that year the proposed new rules were issued. The United States' position hat was developed was taken to the February 1978 International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention. The U.S. position was rejected by that international body. In face of international opposition, the double bottom issue was dropped. 11
In the early days of pipeline design and construction conservative approaches were taken to reduce the environmental risks. The design called for a phased construction schedule. The idea was to get a basic pipeline built and oil flowing while more pump stations, holding tanks, dirty ballast treatment facilities and tankers were built to accommodate the phase III design thrust of 2,000,000, barrels of oil per day (BPD). Once construction began in the spring of 1974, a Herculean effort completed the combined design and construction of phase I(600,000 BPD) and part of phase II (1,500,000 BPD) and oil reached Valdez in July of 1977. As it has turned out, once oil began to flow, the additional treatment process and storage tanks, so vital for the protection of the environment, were never built.
In the fall of 1977 I joined the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, which was given the duty to oversee the day to day operations of the pipeline, terminal and tankers caring Alaskan oil to market. Along with this duty came additional funding for 7 people to conduct oversight. 12 There were other state agencies involved also but they had no regular local presence. In addition, there were several federal agencies involved including the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) but the U.S. Coast Guard was the most visible in Valdez. The USCG and ADEC monitored day to day operations of the Valdez Marine Terminal and the fleet of tankers. EPA came to Valdez only a few times a year.
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